Small Business and
Economic Development for Nebraska by Kirchhoff, Bruce A.
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
Publications of Center for Public Affairs 
Research (UNO) Public Policy Center, University of Nebraska 
1986 
Small Business and Economic Development for Nebraska 
Bruce A. Kirchhoff 
Babson College 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cpar 
 Part of the Public Affairs Commons 
Kirchhoff, Bruce A., "Small Business and Economic Development for Nebraska" (1986). Publications of 
Center for Public Affairs Research (UNO). 18. 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cpar/18 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Public Policy Center, University of Nebraska at 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Publications of Center for 
Public Affairs Research (UNO) by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. 
small Business and 
Economic Development for Nebraska 
;;::: A Kirchhoff 
Fe'( In( )nlic thee lII' and research clata suggest that Nebraska polic),makers should redirect 
economic lb'elopment e/tC)[LS toward the formation and grov"th of small businesses, A 
mechanism is presented for categonzmg small busmesses mto sectors whICh are most 
likeh'to provide the economic gro\\th so necessary to the state, Recommendations tClr 
Illlpt'cnlCl1til1g a scarch and screening process to identify businesses with high-gro\\th 
)otcntial in the state are discussed, Finally, recommendations tor changing policies and 
:)f(lgraIl 1s tll increase the tClfl1lation and gro\\th of small businesses in Nebraska are 
presentcd, 
4 
Since the early 1980s, policy formulators have been intensely 
interested in the role that small businesses play in economic develop 
IllenL The popular belief in post-World War II America that big 
husinesses were the source of economic growth in our society has been 
discredited by recent research. In 1979, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technolot,'Y (MIT) published research which showed that from 1969 
through 1976, small businesses created 82 percent of the net new jobs 
()enerated in the United States. Other research since 1976 has added 
," 
support to MIT's findings. 
Evidence suggests that economic development policies should focus 
on the formation and growth of small businesses, not the growth or 
celocation of large businesses. This is especially important in Nebraska 
\\"here, historically, economic development has emphaSized recruiting 
iJrge businesses to locate new manufacturing plants in the state. Recent 
research suggests that the thrust of economic development should be to 
mcourage entrepreneurs to form and expand businesses in Nebraska. 
Nebraska's growth in the number of nonagricultural businesses has 
iJgged the growth of such businesses nationwide. According to data 
puhlished hI' the US. Small Business Administration (SBA), Nebraska 
had 3),459 nonagricultural business establishments in 1976; in 1982, 
this number had grown by 6.1 percent to 37,638. But, nationwide, the 
number of nonagricultural husiness establishments had grown by 10.3 
percent1 
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To correct such lagging growth, Nebraska's policymakers are faced 
with the difficulty of moving from the historical basis for economic 
development to a new view based upon entrepreneurship. Three major 
issues must be considered carefully: (1) Is the new view of entre. 
preneurial economic growth justified; (2) How do policymakers 
identify the small businesses which should be given economic develop. 
ment attention; and (3) What policies can be used to encourage 
entrepreneurial activity in Nebraska? 
The New View of Small Business 
The central question is whether economic growth based upon small 
businesses is a lasting phenomenon or just a passing fad. If the new view 
lacks either a theoretical base or strong empirical research support it is 
likely to be a fad rather than a foundation for economic development 
policies. 
Theoretical Base for Entrepreneurial Growth 
Historically, small businesses have not been perceived as major 
contributors to economic growth. Conventional wisdom reasoned that 
many small businesses were needed to produce as much economic 
ac'tivity as only one big business. Thus, large businesses were the focus 
of most economic development efforts. This logic was so much a part of 
American life that few questioned it. John Kenneth Galbraith codified 
this belief in The New Industrial State. Therein, Galbraith theorized that 
our nation's economic and social fabric was controlled by a techno-
structure composed of large businesses, large government bureau-
cracies, and large labor unions working together to accomplish society's 
goals of economic growth and stability. 2 
The potential for economic growth in Galbraith's new industrial state 
was vested in large corporations and large government bureaucracies. 
Small businesses were of little importance; many economists, sym-
pathetic to Galbraith's view, considered small businesses to be 
anachronisms - inefficient and economically unimportant. 
Recent Research Evidence 
Yet, even as Galbraith wrote, empirical evidence was being collected 
to refute his big business hypothesis. By 1979, research at MIT revealed 
'incss and Economic Dcvelopmcnt ';!11~dIIlLlS ' . 
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B) percent ofthe new jobs created in our society between 1969 and 
[h~:t6 ~'ere created by firms with less than 100 employees. Dave Birch's 
jl) \'ative approach to analyzing employment data uncovered what no 
111110. )Us economic study was capable of disclosing. And, once he 
11ft'\ [( , . . . . . 
. ) )]ieJ his analysIs, the traditional view that large busmesses dommate 
.III ')1nic growth began to crumble.3 
l,((H1c 
In quick succession, others searched for explanations for why small 
,'[1esses created more jobs. One answer had been found earlier, but buS[ " ' )11e haJ been able to explain it. In a 1976 study conducted for the Ill) ( . . \~ltional Science FoundatIOn, Gellman Research AssoCIates found that 
,mall businesses create 2% times more innovations than large 
businesses.4 The National Science Board then examined its figures on 
research and development expenditures and concluded that small 
businesses generate many more innovations per dollar of research and 
derelopment expense than large businesses.s Later, in a follow-up study, 
Gellman Research Associates found that small businesses create more 
Innorations per employee than large businesses.6 
Since the publication of David Birch's findings in 1979, the SBA has 
~\stematically assembled a data base on small and large businesses 
,imilar to that used by Birch. Analysis of this data base has resulted in 
estimates of the percentage of net new jobs generated in the United 
~t:ltes by businesses with fewer than 100 employees. This percentage 
ranges from a low of 51 percent in the period 1976-80 to a high of 100 
percent from 1980 to 1984.7 Clearly, since 1969, small businesses have 
heen the source of job growth. 
This combination of findings began to suggest an economic growth 
phenomenon most unlike Galbraith's hypothesized new industrial 
,tate. Instead, it identified economic growth patterns that resembled 
those Jescribed by Joseph Schumpeter. 
Schum peter's Entrepreneurial Economy 
Schumpeter perceived the economic structure of our society as being 
dominated by large businesses that find some form of mutually 
Jgreeablc price, product, and quality relationship within their common 
markets8 These implicit agreements constrain the degree of competi 
:Ion in the marketplace. 9 
Price leadership is a commonly observed example of such con 
,trained competition. General Motors (GM), for example, traditionally is 
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the first u.s. automaker to announce price changes (or interest ratt 
changes). The other automakers copy whatever GM announces. 
Schumpeter believed that large businesses would become satisfied With 
their relative market shares in such markets and seek to acquire profits 
without upsetting the agreeable competitive situation. 
True capitalistic competition, Schumpeter noted, emerges when 
entrepreneurs discover innovations which can be used to enter markets 
that are dominated by large businesses and to destroy the competitive 
agreements. In so doing, entrepreneurs create profits for themselves, 
expand overall economic activity, and create increased wealth for 
society as a whole. Entrepreneurial growth occurs both by eroding 
market shares from existing large businesses and by expanding markets 
into new areas. This is Schumpeter's theory of creative destruction, that 
is, creating wealth by destroying current market structures. 
A good example of creative destruction is the start up and success of 
Godfather's Pizza, Inc. Willie Theisen developed a combination of 
innovations-pizza recipe, self-serve restaurant, pricing, restauram 
motif, and advertising and promotion themes. This combination 
allowed Godfather's to enter the restaurant franchise business in 1976 
and become the fastest growing restaurant franchise in the United States 
by 1982. At the same time, large pizza chains, such as Shakey's Pizza and 
Pizza Inn, suffered considerable loss of market share while Pizza Hut was 
forced to reorganize. In the meantime, the entire pizza restaurant 
industry experienced a spurt in growth. Thus, Godfather's entered the 
market with successful innovations, significantly changed the market 
structure by eroding the market share of several established large 
businesses and expanded the pizza restaurant market by appealing to a 
broader segment of the population. lO 
The Godfather's example and many like it make Schumpeter's theory 
fit the research findings on job generation and innovation. small 
innovative businesses then are the source of economic growth; they 
form and grow by creatively destroying existing market structures and so 
produce new wealth and new jobs. 
Why do innovative entrepreneurs choose Nebraska as a place to start 
businesses? Entrepreneurs start businesses where they live, and they 
keep their businesses located where they live. This is logical and many 
research studies have confirmed it. Godfather's was started in Omaha 
because Willie Theisen lived there; in fact, it was started only a few 
blocks from where he lived. 
,'ness and Economic Development ~illall Busi " 
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"u not all small businesses are, nor should they be, creative ~t1 o~ers of the scale of Godfather's. Clearly, some small businesses in 
d.esltr"s"ka can and do become Schumpeter type entrepreneurships; \,e,r ... c 
. I rs do not. However, examples of successful Schumpeter-type 
ot 1~1'esses abound in Nebraska: Pamida, Valmont Industries, Iowa Beef 
hLl~ll c c c 
, 'eSS()rs and Lindsay Sprinkler, But, where are the creative destroyers Pnll c c " 
f tomorroW? How can they be identified? How can Nebraska establish 
II llicies that facilitate formation and growth of these businesses? How 
~)~~n :'>Iebraska take advantage of this new view of small business? 
Identifying Small Businesses with Growth Potential 
There are 7-17 million small businesses in the United States, 
depending on how you count them. It is impossible to focus economic 
de\'elopment efforts on all of these businesses. But, how do economic 
de\'elopment specialists identify which small businesses are potentially 
high-growth businesses? 
polkymakers have long known that small businesses were the 
backbone of Nebraska's agricultural economy, It is obvious, however, 
that these agriculturally related small businesses are not the entre-
preneurs on which the popular press focuses national attention. 
'-Jewspapers and magazines glamorize hi-tech entrepreneurial firms, 
such as Apple Computer Company, Atari, and Compaq Computer. Are 
there such glamorous firms in Nebraska? Where are they? How can they 
be identified? 
Smallness by itself does not identify those businesses which have 
high-growth potential. Instead, smallness identifies a hodgepodge of 
disparate businesses characterized more by differences than by 
similarities. These businesses range from family owned, neighborhood 
retail stores to venture capital owned, innovative computer software 
firms. Identifying which among such a variety of businesses offers 
growth potential is difficult. A new, more useful segmentation of the 
small business sector which identifies business growth is necessary. 
Classifying Small Businesses for Economic Development 
Schumpeter's theories provide a base which can be used to create a 
classification of small businesses for economic development analysis. 
Schumpeter noted that creative destruction resulted in growth of the 
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firm's and the economy's wealth. Schumpeter implicitly assumed that 
growth and innovation were synonymous; innovation produced growth 
and growth emerged naturally from innovation. But, experience tells ~ 
otherwise. Entrepreneurs can innovate without success, and, therefore 
experience no growth. Alternatively, a business can grow, even Withou~ 
innovation, on the strength of an initial successful innovation. For 
example, Godfather's initial innovations provided it with growth fon 
years. 
If we recognize that innovation and growth are two separate 
phenomena, we can then classifY small businesses by their innovation 
rates and growth rates. Such a classification can reveal bUSiness 
characteristics that are particularly relevant to economic development 
Four Segments of the Small Business Sector 
Using the two dimensions of innovation and growth, we can draw a 
matrix that can be divided into four segments (figure 1). The first 
segment is one in which firms experience low growth and low 
innovation rates. This segment contains the largest number of smaIl 
business firms and is called the economic core. Next is the group of 
businesses that have high rates of growth but low rates of innovation. 
These ambitious businesses are truly Schumpeter types in the extent to 
which they creatively destroy markets, but they grow on the basis of their 
initial innovations. The third group of businesses has a high rate of 
innovation but these businesses have not achieved growth, that is these 
businesses have constrained growth due to a lack of success in 
penetrating their intended markets. Fourth are the firms that have high 
rates of innovation and high rates of growth; these are the glamorous 
firms upon which the popular press thrives. 
Economic Core Firms 
By far the greatest number of small business firms are in this category, 
defined as low growth and low innovation. At the time of formation 
these firms innovate enough to destroy a small portion of market 
structure, such as a local market or a specialized part of a national 
market, in an effort to carve out a market position that will establish and 
maintain the firm. But, the innovation is not sufficiently powerful to 
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initiate major market changes so the firm's growth tapers off quickly to 
low and stable rate. Many retail and service firms are of this type~ 
neighborhood auto repair shops, retail boutiques, restaurants, even th~ 
locally owned franchises of national fast-food chains can be cited as 
examples. 
Economic core entrepreneurship is an important contributor to 
economic growth for four reasons. First, formation of each small firm 
creates one or more jobs and expands economic activity. A lot of 
formations take place. For example, according to statistics reported in 
The State oj Small Business the number of establishments in Nebraska 
increased by 2,351 (6 percent) from 1976 to 1982.11 Over two-thirds (69 
percent or 1,618 firms) of the net new business formations were in the 
transportation, wholesale trade, retail trade, finance, insurance, real 
estate and service sectors. This is typical of the economic core. Most 
business formations in Nebraska are economic core firms, and each firm 
creates at least one new job for Nebraska. 
Second, economic core firms are the backbone of retail and wholesale 
trade in rural Nebraska. Without them, the agricultural production 
system would fail. In 1979, Riefler and Lamphear showed that small 
businesses have been the mainstay of commercial activity throughout 
the rural Midwest. 12 Economic core firms are essential to commercial 
activity in Nebraska's cities as well. For example, in Omaha, few national 
food retailing chains have competed successfully with the locally 
owned, small retail chains. Safeway and Hinky Dinky both left Omaha, 
while the locally owned firms seem to thrive. 13 
Third, in periods of economic decline, small firms continue to create 
jobs. Data from the U.S. Small Business Administration show that 
between 1980 and 1982 (a severe recession period) firms with 100 or 
fewer employees in the West North Central Region (Minnesota, Kansas, 
Nebraska, Missouri, Iowa, North Dakota, and South Dakota) created 
91,000 new jobs, while larger firms lost 99,000 jobs. Nationally, small 
businesses created all of the net new jobs during these years. 14 
Fourth, a small but important percentage of economic core firms 
evolve into ambitious businesses. For example, Godfather's Pizza was 
founded as Wild Willy's bar, a locally owned tavern serving southwest 
Omaha. The firm's growth potential was not fully realized until it was 
combined with the restaurant next door, given the name Godfather'S 
Pizza, and franchised nationally. 
" ',s 'ulli Economic Development 
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-\!l1bitiOLIS tlrms are often mixed into discussions of the highly 
, . O\'ati\'e high-growth firms. The assumption is that all high-growth 
Inn 1 I' . B b' . f' I . hI 
'. lS are hig 1 Y rnnovatlve. ut, am ItlOUS Irms are not 11g y 
tull, h' hId I' h' d . dt-
, \"nive. Thev are Ig -growt 1, an t 1elr growt IS enve' rom one, Inn() . ' ..
t-e\\' highlv successful rnnovatlons. II' J . L ' 
I -\!llbitious entrepreneurs consider growth to be their primary objec-
" "I1(i concentrate their resources on the growth process. They avoid 
tl\ t' "' . . 
liluting their growth by allocatrng scarce resources to the creation of 
~lddilionaJ innovations. This can be demonstrated from Godfather's 
l'xperience. 
Once Godfather's Pizza identified its potential for growth, it focused 
its resources on growth. Early in its development, it identified an 
innm'ative combination of product, price, decor, and advertising that 
.;uiled consumers' tastes and produced outstanding protlts for the 
franchise owner. It left this combination relatively unchanged while it 
used its resources to market franchises and to guide the development of 
new restaurants nationwide. Within 6 years, this combination of 
innovations had rocketed Godfather's into the highest rate of growth 
JI110ng food franchise operators in the United States. But, Godfather's 
did not attempt to create any new innovations of the magnitude of its 
uriginal combination, so as it gradually achieved geographic saturation 
\\ith its franchises, its creative destruction impact became less and its 
Lite of grmvth declined. This cycle is typical of ambitious businesses. 
Another example of an ambitious Nebraska firm is Iowa Beef 
Processors, Inc. IBP was founded in the early 1960s with the innovative 
Idt:J of slaughtering, breaking, and butchering beef all under one roof. 
Br the early 1970s, it had changed the entire wholesale beef business by 
rmrketing boxed beef nationally and offering high quality beef at a 
lower per unit processing cost. And, while the large traditional beef 
processors suffered decline, u.s. per capita beef consumption rose in 
lunjunction with declining constant dollar retail prices for beef. 
IBP became a member of Fortune magazine's 500 largest industrial 
ll)mpanies. But, in the 1970s, new competitors emerged while the 
remaining untapped markets proved harder to penetrate. And, changing 
,lJnsumer tastes combined with major innovations in the production, 
priCing, and marketing nf chickpn (~l <:l1h"titlltp nrn,lnd I r""~"'-w1 ,,=r 
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capita beef consumption. 15 IBP's rate of growth declined With the 
changing industry and increased competition. 
Ambitious entrepreneurs bring their innovations into a mark 
structure dominated by large firms. Both Godfather's and IBP enter et 
markets which most experts perceived as saturated and stable. Expeed 
said that the pizza restaurant business would not support another p~ 
chain; they als~) said tha~ t~e wholesale and retail beef business \Vas 
locked up by Wtlson and SWlft. The experts were wrong; such is the stuff 
of innovative entrepreneurs. 
In each of these examples, the desire of the entrepreneur to achiev 
growth through exploitation of an initial innovation led to incr~ 
competition, increased consumer variety, and increased overall con. 
sumption, that is, to new and expanded markets. But, in both examples 
growth eventually declined as the innovation achieved geographi~ 
coverage, new competitors emerged, and market changes became 
incremental. Simultaneously, the entrepreneurial firms became pan of 
the big business economic structure and experienced declining growth. 
The only mechanism available for continuous high rates of growth is 
continuous entrepreneurial innovation. 
Constrained Growth Firms 
Entrepreneurial innovativeness, in Schumpeter's definition, leadsto 
creative destruction of current market structure. But, in reality, some 
highly innovative firms fail to destroy market structure; in such cases, 
something must be constraining the firm's ability to penetrate its chosen 
market. 
Constrained growth firms are those highly innovative firms that 
should be high-growth firms but something constrains the entre· 
preneurs' efforts to enter and change markets. These constraints fall into 
two classes: internal constraints and external constraints. 
Internally Constrained Firms. Internal constraints are imposed by the 
entrepreneur upon the firm's activities. Some entrepreneurs are 
unwilling or unable to grow for reasons within their control. These 
entrepreneurs accept lower levels of market penetration as necessary 
conditions to achieve their other objectives, which mayor may not be 
conscious objectives. In other words, some of their objectives diffe' 
from Schumpeter's theoretical entrepreneurial objectives. These othf 
objectives may be maintenance of individual or family control. 
, K'iS and Economic Development 
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, l'lnce of high rates of internal change (and the strife and trauma 
.Ill11 \ ted ,'lith such change), fear of failure, or simply satisfaction with 
SOLI.! 
.I" ,\liShing and maintaining a secure, adequate, personal income flow . 
• ,[.1 1 fl' h . E l \!:!intenance ~) contro .IS .t e ~ost common constral~t. ntre~ 
, 'Irs recogt11ze that achlevmg high rates of growth reqUlres large 
"I1tl . 
I'll s of capital, sums that exceed the firms' internal cash generating and 
,L1n1. t '1" '[h h d . h h fl' 
. . 'o\v'ing capa -'1 Itles. us, t ey nee to constram t e growt 0 t 1elr 
:1(1I1 L 'd' f' . 1 h . h h' 
'" . or seek OUtSl' e sources 0 equity capita, t at IS, s are owners Ip. 
tlri11~ 
Thl'\ choose t(~ con~train g~owth because they fear loss of control if they 
I ' 'e ownership With outSiders. ,1.11 
-'l.I1other common reason for constraining growth is income targeting. 
'hl' entrepreneur seeks to achieve a level of income which satisfies 
."l'rsl)!1al or family needs. Once this level of income is achieved, the 
~'l1trepreneur's need to commercialize inventions and expand applica~ 
:1(II1S declines and growth slows. Although the entrepreneur may 
Il1tinue innovating, the innovations are not commercialized as quickly, 
,I 
If they are not commercialized at all. Income maintenance dominates 
jc"isionmaking and risk of failure makes investment in innovation and 
'[(I\\th appear as a threat rather than an opportunity. 
- Growth in sales and employment of internally constrained firms lags 
:.11 behind putential. If the innovations are attractive enough, competi~ 
. Irs eventually copy them, enter the market, and carry out the creative 
b[ruction. Inventors who start firms based on a patented invention are 
I~cn surprised to discover that competitive entry is not prohibited by 
:\!tents. Unless the patent holder aggressively commercializes and 
:\p\oits the market potential ofthe invention, competitors will willfully 
Ililate the patent simply because the potential profits more than justifY 
:\!tent infringement penalties. 
For example, a major innovation in pocket pager technology in the 
~.Ifl\' 1970s occurred in the design of a battery power~conserving circuit. 
;111) circuit was invented and patented by the principal owner of Reach 
:iectronics Corporation in Lexington, Nebraska. The patented circuit 
:\tenc\ed the life ofthe battery from 30 days to over 1 year and made the 
:IICket pager a truly reliable device. But, Reach constrained its growth 
l:ld moved slowly into the market. Meanwhile, Motorola copied the 
Ifluit and aggressively moved into the market. The owner sued 
'1l)torola and eventually won the patent suit. But, by the time the suit 
'.1\ settled, Motorola had 95 percent of the u.s. pager market, and had 
:lreasec! employment in Illinois by thousands. 
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Lirge competitors fill the gap created by selfconstrained entre. 
preneurs by licensing patents or by buying out the firms. But, until 
ownership of internally constrained firms changes, rates of growth 
remain low. Such firms meet their owners' needs but fall shon Of 
fulfilling their potential for economic growth. The greatest economic 
growth impact occurs when a firm grows rapidly. 
externally Constrained Firms. Some entrepreneurs are unable to 
obtain the resources they need to exploit their innovations. These tend 
to be new, early developing, innovative firms. The cost of innovation is 
so high that firms either overcome their constraints or fail within a few 
years. Their products or services have not yet demonstrated market 
worthiness or management has not yet proven itself capable of 
performing. Thus, suppliers restrict or withhold credit, banks limit their 
lending, and venture capitalists hesitate to invest, asking instead for 
proof of ability to succeed. 
Furthermore, suppliers of special resources, parts, or subassembli~ 
hesitate to supply small quantities because of high start-up costs and 
credit risk. At the same time, distributors are reluctant to stock the firm's 
product or even actively sell it until the market is defined or the firm 
shows itself to be a survivor. This is the small business Catch 22. Showing 
proof of success as required by potential investors is not possible until 
after the investors invest and the markets develop. 
If an externally constrained firm survives and demonstrates market 
potential for its product or service, resource constraints will disappear. 
In the meantime, the firm struggles for survival and remains resource 
starved with an economic growth potential unfulfilled. 
Another possibility is that the externally constrained firm can be 
bought out by a large firm before its potential is realized. If this happens, I 
it is probable that the firm's potential for destroying market structure will 
never be realized, because market turmoil is resisted by the large firm. It 
will prefer to exploit the innovations in an orderly way that does not 
radically upset the current competitive agreements in the market. Th~ 
may benefit the exploiting firm, but it results in reduced economic 
growth for society as a whole. 
Examples of externally constrained firms abound in the consulting 
studies done by the Nebraska Business Development Center. Few of 
these are known because they are not the focus of public attention 01 
press reports. For example, Goldenrod Research Inc., of Spalding, 
. 1t'ss and Economic Development 
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. >\)raska, is a strug~li~? computer. manuf~cturer that is trying to raise 
\. L f·. "11t canital to mltlate market mg. WhImseys of Omaha manufac It Icte t 
'l . nicjue Christmas tree ornaments for which there is a substantial Ires U 
tl ket a long list of new products, and a need for an investor who can 
!ll~lr 'e~'e as a business manager. Which of these might be Nebraska's 
Iho s 
: (J!1gfo,vth firm of the 1990s? 
11 I (]l'crl'iCU , cd Constrained Growth Firms. Constrained growth entre-
'neUfS are, in fact, small firms whose contributions to economic 
11rt "t11 remain unrealized. Highly innovative, they possess the capability 
lll0" '~) become high-growth firms. 
t( constrained growth firms deserve special attention by policymakers 
because their economic growth potential is so great. Externally 
lUJ1straineci firms are of particular interest to economic polic}'makers; 
,uch firms have considerable potential for economic growth but teeter 
(111 the brink of failure. The extent to which they overcome their 
llll1straints will determine whether they do or do not contribute to 
l'Lonomic growth. Capital, especially start-up capital to turn inventions 
into innovations, is the most frequent growth constraining resource for 
~ll(h firms. 
Venture capital firms see many such firms but turn away most because 
thev lack defined markets and management expertise. Research funded 
Il\' the National Science Foundation suggests that venture capitalists 
r~;rely invest in externally constrained firms. An analysis of the average 
\~dlle of venture capital investments and the number of investments in 
technologically innovative firms during the early and seed stages of 
development reveals significantly lower investment than at later stages 
IIf the firm's development. 16 Venture capital firms prefer less risky 
lJ1\·estments. 
On the other hand, research for the U.S. Small Business Admin-
istration suggests that informal investors appear to be the predominant 
Investors in externally constrained firms. Such informal investors, 
however, usually invest only an average of $25,000. 17 
Furthermore, such firms are among the highest risk category of 
1l1\estment ventures and, therefore, have little luck at borrowing from 
financial institutions. I have demonstrated that financial institutions will 
refuse to lend to such firms rather than lend at interest rates adjusted for 
nsk l8 Thus, while ambitious firms usually encounter capital problems 
J\Sociated with their growth, constrained growth firms encounter capital 
;lroblems before growth can be realized. 
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Of all the small business segments, glamorous firms demonstrate the 
greatest economic development deriving from sustained high grOwth. 
These firms have high rates of innovation and achieve high rates of 
growth from successful exploitation of their many innovations. GrOwth 
continues as long as the firms develop innovations and successfully use 
them to destroy economic structure. 
These are called glamorous firms because they receive so much 
publicity for their contribution to economic growth. Such firms stan 
small but are rarely small for long. Once such a firm passes the period of 
constrained growth, it catapults into the large firm sector. The founding 
entrepreneurs become locally (or nationally) renowned, and the press 
extols the virtues of successful entrepreneurship. Only the founders 
understand the agony of the start up and the initial struggle to survive. 
Such entrepreneurs place priority on innovation and growth. They 
believe that growth is the outcome of innovation, and, therefore, they 
pursue innovation. Alternatively, they may simply prefer innovation as a 
way of life. Growth is sustainable as long as the firm creates innovations 
that attack current markets. 
Many of today's large firms began as glamorous small firms. For 
example, Control Data Corporation was started by several scientists who 
wanted to innovate outside the constraints of their previous employer. 
Their commitment to innovation carried them into a long series of new 
computers and applications and into a large corporation. Wang labora· 
tories and Digital Equipment Company have similar stories. And, Apple 
Computer is in the throes of proving its ability to sustain innovative 
growth. 
But, even highly innovative firms eventually experience declining 
rates of innovation and subsequently declining growth. Once the 
entrepreneurial spirit of innovation wanes, bureaucratic behaviors 
emerge and entrepreneurship vanishes. Instead, large firms begin to 
focus on lower risk strategies and defense of current market shares, 
thereby becoming the target of new entrepreneurs. 
Nebraska has examples of glamorous firms; Norden Laboratories of 
Lincoln, First Data Resources of Omaha, and, most recently, Applied 
Communications of Omaha. Valmont Industries, Inc., has a history that 
may typity these firms. Val mont began in 1946 when Robert Daugherty 
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j his uncle purchased Platte Valley Manufacturing, a firm that 
ItlL 
. ,nufactured farm elevators for Sears, Roebuck and Company. Although 
tl1.l'cessful, the firm recognized the mechanical irrigation equipment of 
~l~~nk zybach as an important innovation and bought him out in 1953. 
f~:ltte Valley Manufactauring worked on the development of irrigation ~ uipment for 8 years before its market penetration became significant. 
~1~11960, Platte Valley Man~facturing recognized. that its ~anufacturing 
bility with steel tapered ptpe could be used to 1Onovate 10 the market 
;~)r electrical utility poles. Market penetration was slow here as well. 
By 1963, Platte Valley Manufacturing had only 180 employees and $6.2 
million in sales. But, demand for irrigation equipment began to grow. In 
1967, the firm was renamed Valmont and then a public issue of stock was 
made in 1968, a year in which its annual sales reached $22.3 million. By 
1976, mechanical irrigation equipment sales peaked and the firm had 
des 0[$105 million. Then, electrical product sales began to grow faster 
[han irrigation equipment. In 1980, total sales reached $152 million. In 
1982, Val mont innovated again by forming a retail computer sales 
husiness, Valcom. By 1985, Valmont's sales reached $313 million with 
1.960 employees. Irrigation equipment, electrical products, and 
computers-three major innovations to achieve more than a tenfold 
increase in sales and employment in 20 years. 19 
Glamorous firms probably represent the smallest percentage of small 
tirms. Twelve to 15 percent of small firms create most new jobs,20 and 
glamorous and ambitious firms constitute no more than 12-15 percent of 
[hat number of small firms. Venture capital data suggest that ambitious 
tlrms dominate within this group.21 
!Veus of Economic Development 
Ideally, economic development efforts should identify ambitious and 
glamorous firms as they are formed and provide support for them as they 
grow and create increased wealth for the state. But, glamorous firms 
usually start as constrained growth firms and ambitious firms typically 
have roots as economic core firms. 
:-.Ieither glamorous nor ambitious firms are amenable to typical 
g()vernment polk]' prescriptions. For example, I have shown that federal 
[:LX policies, enacted on the basis that they would be good for small 
husinesses, had little impact on ambitious or glamorous firms and 
P()ssibly negative effects on constrained growth firms.22 Simply stated, 
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once a firm enters the ambitious and glamorous categories the ability of 
any public policy to affect its growth is questionable. 
Thus, the greatest effect economic development policies can ha~ 
and should have is on the constrained growth and economic core 
sectors. These sectors are characterized by formation activity and limit~ 
growth. Economic core firms do not aspire to growth. COnstrained 
growth firms are constrained in their growth ambitions. Thus, pOlicy 
prescriptions should address two principal characteristics of small 
businesses: 
Formation 
Growth 
What can be done to increase the rate of 
business formations? Unless new businesses 
are formed, opportunities for economic 
growth eventually wane as the economic 
structure becomes dominated by large firms 
that are intent on defending their current 
markets. 
What can be done to increase the rate of 
growth of businesses? Unless economic 
conditions facilitate new business growth, 
new business formations will stagnate as 
either economic core or constrained growth 
businesses. Either way, the largest part of 
their contribution to economic growth will 
not be realized. 
Effective encouragement of entrepreneurial activities in Nebraska 
requires that economic development policies address business forma· 
tion and growth needs. 
Encouraging Formation and Growth of Small Businesses 
Resources are the essential elements of formation and growth 01 
businesses. To form a business, an entrepreneur net;ds to perceive thai 
the resources necessarv for success are available. To make a busine51 
. . 
grow the entrepreneur must convert perceptions of resources into actua 
rp'()llf'('f'S. 
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• Managerial knowledge and ability in diverse areas such as per 
sonne!, marketing, accounting, finance, law, and production. 
• Scientific knowledge and ability in areas such as product design, 
engineering, manufacturing ~ystems, and materials testing, 
• Debt capital, This is money which must be repaid along with interest 
to a lender at some defined future date. 
• Equity capital, This is money which may (or may not) be repaid at an 
undetlned future date if the firm achieves adequate earnings. 
others may suggest a different list of resource categories; for example, 
l'!Jssical economics uses three classes of resources, land, labor, and 
capital, Land seems of little importance because it is easily inter 
changeable with capital in today'sAmerican economy. Labor remains an 
important variable and is incorporated in the list by referencing the 
critical elements oflabor in an advanced technological economy, that is, 
specialized knowledge and ability. These are the constraining charac-
tcristics of labor resources. 
111e list somewhat artificially separates knowledge into business 
related subjects and scientific and engineering subjects. Managerial 
knowledge is defined as business knowhow. Scientific knowledge is 
defined as science and engineering knowhow. This distinction is not as 
obvious to the practicing entrepreneur as it is to polky analysts, but it 
remains an important designation for polky development because the 
'ubjects are clearly separated within the state's educational system and 
have been conventionally treated as separate subjects in the literature on 
entrepreneurship. 
For policy purposes, there are substantial differences between debt 
Jnd equity s< lUrces of capital, For example, debt repayment is made from 
earnings before taxes with interest, a tax-deductible expense, whereas 
equity repayment must be made with after tax earnings. This makes 
capital acquisition sensitive to tax policy. Again, entrepreneurs will not 
Ilften see the difference between these two as relevant to their 
IJperatiol1s. but the differences are important to policy formation. These 
hlUf categories capture the essential nature of business resources for 
policy develupment. 
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The Motive to be Entrepreneurial 
Another aspect of entrepreneurship not mentioned in the list of 
resources is motivation, that spirit of human beings which fosters and 
promotes the vision of business formation and growth in the minds of 
men and women. No one fully understands why or where this spirit 
originates, but there is no reason to believe that Nebraskans are any less 
endowed with this spirit than other Americans. 
Some very useful research has been conducted on the motivation of 
entrepreneurs by David McClelland and others. McClelland has defined 
a human characteristic called achievement motivation that is related to 
entrepreneurial behavior. Several major behavioral change programs 
have been developed and tested in the United States and other nations. 
Generally, these programs have been successful, especially in the 
formation of economic core businesses in less developed nations.23 
However, it is generally believed that middle class persons in the 
United States are imbued with a significant natural tendency tOWard 
entrepreneurial behavior and, therefore, behavioral change programs 
are not used widely in our nation. Whether they should be more widely 
used in the United States is an interesting question, but a question 
outside the range of this chapter. 
Managerial Knowledge and Ability 
As soon as a business is formed it becomes a taxable entity. Thus, the 
need for business knowledge suddenly burdens the entrepreneur with 
recordkeeping. And, forever thereafter there are demands for specific 
types of technical knowledge on business topics. 
It is rare to find anyone in any business organization, no matter how 
large, who has enough knowledge about all aspects of running a 
business that advice from technical consultants is not needed. Large 
businesses meet this need by hiring a bevy of experts-personnel 
specialists to interview and hire, financial wizards to manipulate cash 
balances, and accountants to record every action the firm takes. Bu~ 
small business owners or managers do not have access to these experts, 
and lack of such expertise can lead to constraints upon formation and 
growth. 
Such lack of expertise is very specific and unique to each business and 
market situation. General education programs, either credit or non· 
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'edit, rarely address the individual manager's knowledge needs at the 
lfrel of specificity required. Delivery of managerial assistance to small 
Ie sinesses requires individualized instruction; such individualized bl~truetiOn is conventionally called consulting, that is, a knowledgeable 
I:~ ,ert communicating with a small business manager one on one. 
t. \te U.S. Small Business Administration's (SBA) accumulated experi-
nee of over 30 years of management assistance to small businesses 
clearly indicates that effective management assistance for small busi-
l esses requires individualized consultation. It is for this reason that the n .-
l',S. Congress authorized the SBA to implement the Small Business 
Development Centers (SBDCs) in seven states in 1976. The SBDCs were 
designed to provide management assistance to small businesses by 
using the faculty of university business schools to provide consulting 
~lnd training. 
The SBDCs' principal program is providing individualized consulting 
to small businesses. The success of this program is evident by SBA's 
gradual phase out of many of its Management Assistance Programs, while 
increasingly relying on the SBDCs and the Service Core of Retired 
Executives (SCORE) Program, wherein retired executives consult with 
small business owners individually. 
No small business possesses all of the managerial expertise necessary 
to cover its business needs. To facilitate business formation and growth, 
individualized consulting services must be provided to small busi-
nesses, especially externally constrained growth businesses whose 
constraint may be business knowledge rather than capital. 
Technical Assistance 
Those who specialize in the sciences and engineering will recognize 
the Similarity between the comment about specialized knowledge and 
the need for individualized consulting rather than broad-brush educa-
tional programs. Each small business with a technical problem needs 
specialized one-of-a-kind assistance. 
Again, such consultation is needed on an individual basis. And, the 
lack of such technical assistance could limit the formation and growth of 
,mall bUSinesses, especially the externally constrained growth busi-
nesses whose constraining resource may be scientific knowledge rather 
than financing. 
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But, the differences between management assistance and technical 
assistance are not as clear to working entrepreneurs as they are to 
policymakers. Many business problems can be recast easily as sCientific 
problems. For example, selling a high-priced product may be perceived 
as a marketing problem. On the other hand, the same problem could be 
perceived as a technical problem of finding a cheaper raw material for 
producing the product, thereby permitting reduction of its price. This 
blend of business and scientific knowledge is understood by those who 
routinely perform such problem analyses, that is, entrepreneurs. But 
every technical expert typically brings bias to problems so that th~ 
definition of the problem reflects scientific or business specialty. Thus 
entrepreneurs are required to define their problems before they selec~ 
consultants. 
This is a dilemma policymakers must face if they are to promote the 
formation and growth of businesses. How can the government facilitate 
problem definition so that entrepreneurs can obtain assistance, either 
business or technical? 
Debt Capital 
Debt capital is not as readily available as economists generally 
theorize. The reason is that financial institutions do not vary interest 
rates to adjust for variations in risk on small business loans. Instead, 
lenders tend to either lend or not lend, that is, they ration funds. And, the 
lenders' assessment of risk is heavily dependent upon a firm's history of 
financial performance.24 Furthermore, when they do lend, financial 
institutions charge small businesses an interest premium dispropor-
tionately large relative to the risk involved.25 
Most small businesses, especially economic core businesses, have 
limited access to markets for loan funds compared with large businesses, 
and, therefore, depend almost entirely upon financial institutions for 
their debt capital. Under these conditions, many small businesses 
simply have no access to loan funds. This is especially true for newly 
formed businesses because they lack financial histories and are assessed 
as high risk,>. 
Economists often note that debt to asset levels among small 
businesses, especially economic core businesses, are typically higher 
than those of large businesses in the same industries. However, 
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. nomic core businesses are usually closely held and the personal 
t'lO 
ets of the owners are pledged as collateral for debt; because personal 
asS d f h b' , h d b 
. ets are not reporte as part 0 t e usmesses assets, tee t to asset a.s~o is overstated. Thus, apparent high-debt levels are probably not out 
r,~ line with conservative institutional lending practices. Furthermore, 
II cent research has shown that smaller economic core businesses are 
r~ore profitable and demonstrate less risk as measured by their profits 
~datiVe to their debt obligations than larger businesses in the same 
. 26 industries. 
contrary to popular opinion, small businesses are not high-risk 
borrowers. Thus, economic core businesses are capable of handling 
birly large amounts of debt relative to their larger counterparts. So the 
cost and availability of loan funds from institutional lenders is an issue of 
importance to policymakers who are committed to encouraging the 
formation of new businesses, especially among economic core firms 
which, among other things, regularly spawn ambitious firms. 
Equity Capital 
New businesses, especially those with considerable growth potential, 
need patient money. Patient investors understand that such businesses 
typically do not earn profits in excess of their internal cash needs for 7-10 
rears. Although the returns the investor eventually reaps may more than 
justify the wait, the investor must be patient. 
Typically, these patient investors are not venture capital firms but 
individuals who invest $25,000 to $50,000 and patiently wait for the 
long-term payback. Such individuals playa vital role in the formation 
and early stage development of glamorous and ambitious small 
businesses. It is essential that entrepreneurs have access to patient 
investors, investors who have been characterized as informal investors.27 
There are good reasons why patient investors are needed for firms that 
pursue high growth objectives. Growth, especially high growth, con-
~umes much capital. Thus, ambitious and glamorous firms rarely 
generate cash equal to their internal needs. They have little or no ability 
II) repay investors for many years even when profit margins are high. This 
means that ambitious and glamorous firms cannot depend on debt as a 
major source of financing because debt to financial institutions brings an 
Ilhligation to repay within 5 years or less. 28 Typically, principal and 
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interest payments begin in the first period after the loan is made. Debt 
repayment is a cash outflow that can constrain the firm's rate of grOwth 
thereby decreasing the ability to produce economic growth. ' 
Too often entrepreneurs seek and obtain debt capital only to diScover 
that debt repayment exhausts their initial success and drains their firms' 
ability to grow. Thus, an economic core firm is formed, grows to a 
limited size, and then stabilizes as it services its debt. The constrained 
growth firm is formed and then exhausts its capital in debt repayment 
while it is still in the early innovation stage of development. It then 
struggles to obtain more debt, never realiZing that it is the debt capital 
that is constraining its rate of growth. 
Exceptions to these general observations exist but there are many 
reasons why informal investors are often referred to as investor angels. A 
viable economic development policy should address the informal 
investor issue. Without patient money, many potentially ambitious 
businesses will remain in the economic core and many potential 
glamorous businesses will never break free of constrained growth. 
Eventually, as the entrepreneur begins to reap profits, the firm 
develops the need for large sums of capital (millions of dollars). With 
good planning (and a little luck), the firm will become sufficiently 
attractive so that it can obtain financing from venture capital firms. 
Venture capital is Widely available in the United States and, although 
only two somewhat limited venture capital firms operate in Nebraska 
today, there are several regional firms that are constantly searching the 
Midlands for potential investments. 
Another opportunity for capital acquisition is the public issue of stock. 
Although somewhat more expensive, a public issue can raise large sums 
of capital while avoiding taking on a significant Single owner who may 
attempt to control the firm. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that Nebraska has not provided adequate 
venture capital for its growing firms. Many Nebraska growth firms have 
found it desirable or necessary to sell themselves to large corporations 
to meet their growth needs. First Data Resources sold itself to American 
Express. Behlen Manufacturing of Columbus sold itself to Wickes.29 
Swanson Foods sold itselfto Campbell Soup after many years of success. 
Norton Laboratories, Skinner Macaroni Company, the list goes on and 
on. One cannot help wondering if these sales resulted in more 
economic growth in the home state of the acquiring firm rather than in 
Nebraska. 
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Public policy needs to address the issues of informal venture capital 
for economic core and con~trained growth firms and venture capital for 
ambitiOUS and glamorous firms. 
Sununary of Resource Needs 
This review of the character of the required resources and the 
limitations on these resources shows how the formation and growth of 
'Ilull businesses can be constrained and makes it evident that the ~ )rimary assistance needs lie among the economic core and constrained ~ro\vth firr.ns. Firms from these sec~ors th~t a~pire.t~ ent~r t~e gla~or?~s 
and ambitious sectors are faced With major l11efflclencles 111 avaIlablltty 
of resources through the private sector. Information and capital are not 
readily available. The business and scientific knowledge needed may be 
prohibitively expensive if it is purchased from private consultants. While 
debt capital is expensive and difficult to obtain for most small firms, debt 
capital is not available from lending institutions at any cost for newly 
formed firms, unless the entrepreneurs have personal assets to pledge. 
Many business formations fail at the outset for lack of capital and 
knowledge. If formation is succesful, debt capital eventually becomes 
available, hut then the small business must seriously question whether 
debt is appropriate for the firm's growth objectives. Private sector 
business and scientific assistance continue to be expensive relative to 
the firm's revenues, and the entrepreneurs somehow must possess the 
knowledge necessaty to define what assistance they need before an 
expert consultant can be requested. Growth requires patient investment 
capital. Yet, finding an investing angel is far from easy in Nebraska. 
Once firms grow into ambitious or glamorous status, their technical 
assistance and debt capital needs are addressed adequately within the 
private sector. They are capable of purchaSing both business and 
scientific expertise, either by hiring employees or by paying consultants. 
And, they have greater access to debt capital markets simply because 
they have histories of strong financial performance. However, acquisi-
tion oflarge sums of venture capital may be constrained in Nebraska, so 
many firms have sought and obtained acquisition by wealthier firms 
headquartered outside of Nebraska. 
These are the issues which Nebraska policymakers need to address to 
promote economic development. The formation and growth of small 
businesses 'Nill contribute greatly to economic development within the 
state. 
94 Bruce A Kirchhoff 
Public Policies to Address Small Businesses' Needs 
Before describing policies which will address the problems of 
formation and growth of small businesses, there are several caveats 
about popular economic development myths which must be addressed. 
Numerous, simple broad-brush policies are frequently mentioned in the 
popular press, political campaign rhetoric, and even among economic 
development specialists. Recruiting new plants with tax reductions 
employee training programs, and tax free property remain popular: 
Assisting high-technology startups with state equity investment capital, 
technology incubators, and innovation centers are equally new~worthy. 
But, caution must be exercised before leaping into popular programs 
without carefully assessing Nebraska's unique business environment. 
Problems with Recruiting Big Businesses' Plants 
There are no quick and easy solutions to Nebraska's problems. 
Emphasizing publicly visible, front-page newsworthy, flashy solutions to 
economic development is a futile exercise, perhaps even publicly 
irresponsible. Spending large sums of money to recruit a major 
manufacturing plant from a large corporation is a high-risk adventure. If 
one wins, it can be politically rewarding, but a loss may exhaust the 
limited resources of the state. 
Even if a new plant comes to Nebraska, it may take years for the plant 
to generate spin off businesses, that is, new small firms formed from the 
technology base of the large firm, either as suppliers or competitors of 
the large firm. Or spin-offs may never occur. Where are the spin-offs from 
New Holland's combine plant in Lexington? There are none because 
New Holland did not bring any technology base with this plant. This is 
not uncommon with large corporation assembly plants.3o Not surpris-
ingly, there are no spinoffs from Kawasaki's motorcycle plant in Lincoln. 
There are assembly jobs in Lincoln but the technology base is in Japan. 
Unless an expansion or relocated plant brings a complete core of 
technology and husiness experts with it, spinoffs are unlikely. An 
environment conducive to new technology-based business t<xmations 
requires a core, a critical mass of technology. Such a core oftechnolOh'Y 
flleled Silicon Valley around San Jose, California. 
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rechnologically Based Economic Development Experiences 
It is doubtful that any state can duplicate the exact experience of 
.;ilicon Valley, or Route 128 around Boston, or Bionic Valley in Salt lake 
Cit\'. A look at the reality of these examples may help explain why. 
Every state wants its own Silicon Valley like California. But, reality is 
somewhat different. Researchers at Stanford Research International 
(-ound that Silicon Valley had its roots in the founding ofHewlett-P'dckard 
Corporation in a garage in San Mateo during the late 1930s. later, 
.;ran ford University was pressed for money to modernize its research 
laboratories, so it began cooperative research with Hewlett-Packard in 
the 1950's. Attracted by these researchers, the developer of the transistor 
left Bell Laboratories, moved to Silicon Valley and started a new 
transistor manufacturing operation. Growth was slow but continuous as 
new electronics firms began as spin-offs from Hewlett-Packard and 
stanford University. Silicon Valley, as we know it today, took 30 to 40 
rears to develop.31 
. Route 128 in Boston is another model often recommended in 
~ebraska. Published research by Bennett Harrison documents the 
decline of the New England textile and shoe industries beginning 
around the turn of the century and culminating in high rates of 
unemployment during the 1960s and early 1970s. This high unem-
ployment laid the foundation for Boston's rejuvenation by preparing 
workers for radical changes in careers, from stitching shoes to pro-
gramming computers. Even as late as 1973-75, Boston had one of the 
highest unemployment rates in the nation. The Boston area's economy 
hecame really bad before it began to get better.32 
Utah's Bionic Valley, teamed the University of Utah with entrepreneurs 
and a federally funded innovation center. This spawned a bevy of 
high-tech medical companies that are producing mechanical hearts, 
artificial kidneys, and bionic human arms. Again, careful research shows 
that Bionic Valley has its roots in a major commitment to science made 
hythe President of the University of Utah 20 years ago. And, Bionic Valley 
is only now beginning to payoff for Utah.33 Just as Utah's economic 
development had a long-term horizon, it also had an arduous journey. 
The University of Utah maintained its commitment to medical research 
in spite ofthe state legislature's reduction of its budget during the 1970s 
I measured in deflated dollars) and the cancellation of federal funding 
for its innovation center after only 4 years. 
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These stories show the special nature of economic development. 
There are few, if any, commonalities to the way economic success came 
to these three areas. Each state must carve its own story, its own Special 
way of achieving growth. 
Nebraska's Limited Resources 
Nebraska has special problems, not the least of which is severe limits 
on public revenues. The people of Nebraska have decided to reduce 
proportionally the property tax on agriculture, and, by computing 
income tax as a percentage of the federal income tax, Nebraska has 
decided to draw proportionately smaller income taxes from agricultural 
operations. Essentially, Nebraska has decided to reduce taxes on its 
largest industry, thereby reducing its revenue generating capaCity. 
Although Nebraska has high tax rates, the base is narrow, so it collects 
relatively low revenues. 
Furthermore, in Nebraska the major business and population center 
(Omaha) and the university's technology center (Lincoln) are geo· 
graphically separated. The three examples cited above had universities 
located within their geographic areas, and they were part of the 
economic development stories. The Board of Regents of the University 
of Nebraska merged the University of Nebraska at Omaha engineering 
school into the University of Nebraska-Lincoln to avoid program 
duplication and to conserve scarce financial resources. But, the long· 
term result was a geographical barrier to building a technology core in 
Omaha. 
Policy Recommendations 
Given these caveats, there are some specific policy recommendations 
which are essential to the economic development of Nebraska. Each of 
the follOWing requires action by Nebraska's state government so that the 
four needs of economic core and constrained growth businesses can be 
better met, thereby fostering increased formation and growth of 
businesses. 
Two areas cry out for immediate short run attention: assistance with 
business knowledge and availability of informal venture capital. In the 
longer run, assistance with scientific knowledge is also needed. 
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}faintain and Improve Business Assistance 
There are three reasons why the state should target husiness 
"I'stance ahove all other policies. First, most economic core and 'I'~ , ~';)nstrained growth husinesses in the state are not users of high 
technology and, therefore, they are unlikely to spawn science·hased 
~lInbitioUs or glamorous husinesses. Most are service businesses; those 
that are in man ufacturing use relatively little advanced technology. 'Thus, 
knowledge constraints on these businesses are likely to be husiness 
knowledge. 
Second, Nehraska's post·secondary educational system does not have 
J reputation for state· of the art technology in any applied high· 
technology field. Simply stated, currently the critical mass technology 
does not exist in this state's higher education system.34 Thus, building a 
,rate·of.theart technical base will require a long· term commitment, 
,uch as the University of Utah's 20·year commitment to bionic medical 
research. Little can be done in the short run. 
Third, the technology base in Nebraska resides among private sector 
businesses and, as such, is amenable to business knowledge assistance 
rather than technical assistance. For example, computer software for 
financial transactions has become a major business in Omaha. First Data 
Resources, Inc., and Applied Communications, Inc., serve as the core ofa 
growing field in which many small firms now operate. Another example 
exists in central Nebraska where many electronics manufacturing firms 
are located, for example, Reach Electronics in Lexington and Dale 
Electronics in Columhus. Facilitating technology transfer among similar 
tlrms requires husiness assistance rather than scientific consulting. Thus, 
business assistance is the major priority in Nebraska for encouraging 
increased formation and growth of small businesses. 
Jfaintain the Current Level of Business Assistance 
Maintenance of business assistance programs is first among polic)' 
prescriptions hecause the federal government is reducing its commit· 
ment to funding such assistance in Nehraska. The state must act to 
[('place this funding or the level of business assistance will decline. For 
l'"ample, the Nehraska Business Development Center (NBDC) is ahout 
t() lose half of its federal funds. NBDC provided consultations to 1,165 
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Nebraska businesses in 1985. This activity will be cut in half in 1987 
unless the federal funding is properly replaced and matched, a decision 
the Legislature must make in early 1987. 
Expand Business Consulting Activities 
Because no one can predict which economic core or cOnstrained 
growth businesses will succeed, the proper polic)' is to help all small 
businesses. However, those that appear to have the potential for high 
growth should be identified during the consulting process and moved 
into a more intensive assistance program. 
Nebraska should develop a two tiered business assistance program. 
The first tier should be designed to provide consulting to all economic 
core and constrained growth businesses. Additionally, business consul-
tants should be trained to screen these businesses to identify those with 
high-growth potential. Businesses with high-growth potential should be 
passed on to a second-tier business assistance program. 
This second tier of management assistance should reduce signifi-
cantlythe resource constraints these businesses experience. The second 
tier of consulting programs should contain science and technology 
consultants as well as more specialized business consultants. For 
example, businesses should be able to obtain technical advice on 
designing plants and procuring scientific materials. Management assis-
tance should include specialized knowledge, such as legal assistance on 
franchising, accounting assistance on financing schemes, broker advice 
on stock issues, and introductions to informal venture capitalists. 
This program could be designed so that each firm in the assistance 
program would be assigned to a lead consultant. The lead consultant 
would follow the monthly progress of the firm and direct technical 
specialists to consult with the firm as needs develop. Such an 
arrangement would ensure the firm of technical assistance and also 
assistance in identifying problems. The lead consultant could match the 
state sponsored assistance resources to the client's needs. 
This second tier of intensive consulting is very important to removing 
constraints on potential ambitious and glamorous businessses. Yet, it is 
velY risky because useful guidelines for identifying successful busi-
nesses have not been developed. Many of the assisted firms will fail, 
others will struggle along with little or no growth, but, a few will 
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"eed The fewwill have to be the total measure of success of the effort ~L1ll . 
, 1 expense expended. 
'InU ' 
. The twO tier system of consulting allows for some reduction in the 
11ber of clients served by the more intensive and expensive second 
nlll 
. r The first tier could use NBDC's faculty and student consultants. (Ie ' 
'!11ese consultants could weed out the many entrepreneurs with 
underde\Oeloped plans and those with fantasies, not dreams. Most 
\enwre capitalists yearn for such a screening system and acknowledge 
that they typically read a lot of fantasy business plans before they see a 
realistic dream. 
A separate organization for the second tier of consulting is not 
necessary; it is only necessary to organize and operate the consulting 
serdce differently. It may be desirable to house the second-tier lead 
consultants in the NBDC because it currently has the broadest geo-
graphiC coverage of the state. However, under its current federally 
~Jl1ded programs, NBDC cannot provide more than three consultancies 
tll a firm within a 2 year period. Thus, state funding would be required to 
fund this second-tier consulting program. 
Promote Networks Among Technologically Based Firms 
Substantial technical assistance is available through networking 
among technologically based firms. For example, a recently started 
computer manufacturing firm in Spalding, Goldenrod Research, Inc., 
interacts with Farrall Electronics, Inc., in Grand Island to exchange 
information. Such networking should become more organized for the 
henefit of more electronics firms, especially the newly formed and 
developing firms. 
Other technologically based businesses should have Nebraska net-
works. Formal network linkages should be created among such firms. 
For example, a network of interaction and communication among the 
electronic manufacturing firms in central Nebraska may reduce con 
qraints on growth and allow the firms to grow more rapidly, thereby 
creating more jobs. 
Such networks could be developed by the second-tier consultants 
,uggested in the first policy recommendation. The lead consultants 
muld he aSSigned by industry so that they could organize and facilitate 
these networks. 
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Provide Informal Venture Capital 
A<; noted earlier, the informal investor is needed to provide equity 
capital to economic core and constrained growth firms that ar 
struggling to grow. But, informal investors are few and far between.1'h e 
are in Nebraska, but they are not organized into an accessible grOUp~ 
Other states have formed venture capital clubs to serve as focal points 
for developing a network of informal investors. Such a club has been 
formed in Omaha and now has 38 full-time members. Efforts to form a 
club in Grand Island have begun with some success. However, the State 
Banking Department believes that these venture capital clubs violate 
Nebraska's securities laws. Their view is that presentation of an 
investment plan at a venture capital club meeting is equivalent to 
offering to sell stock to everyone in attendance. Using this interpretation 
the presentation at Grand Island's first venture capital club meeting: 
attended by 200 to 300 individuals, was a gross violation of Nebraska's 
securities laws which limit unregistered stock offerings to a maximum of 
35 persons. 
The State Banking Department should be requested to draw up 
appropriate legislation to allow entrepreneurs to make presentations at 
venture capital club meetings without violating securities laws. Thus, 
venture capital clubs could be organized statewide to facilitate economic 
development throughout the state. Funds should be appropriated to 
promote and advise communities in the formation of venture capital 
clubs. Coordination among these clubs should be a necessity as well. 
Again, these assistance and coordination activities should be assumed 
by existing state organizations. 
Develop Business and Scientific Assistance and an Innovation Center 
Entrepreneurs seldom perceive the clear separation between busi· 
ness and scientific assistance. They have an innovation and want it to 
become a business. Thus, entrepreneurs need assistance in separating 
problems into business and scientific categories. Nebraska should 
establish an innovation center with the primary purpose of consulting 
with entrepreneurs to define their problems and to guide them into 
proper consulting relationships. 
The innovation center should be a joint effort combining manage· 
ment and scientific assistance. It should function as a clearinghouse for 
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,reneurs with innovative ideas. The ideas should be presented to a 
'ntref . I d 1 . C I' d l I of techmca an )usmess experts lor eva uatlon an recom-
11Jn e h' II' I i']tions. In t IS way, entrepreneurs wou ( receive an overa I l11enc '-' 
I ,]tion of their businesses and the requirements for development l'\'J u,-, 
Ind growth. 
, -!11iS innovation center need only have a small staff because it could 
\ . w its business and scientific experts from the universities and 
~l~~~iness communities of Nebra~ka, But, it needs a large bud~et for 
, 1sulting expenses and promotIon expenses, unless the state Imple-lll[ . 
l11ents the two-tier management assistance (consulting) program 
rccommended earlier. The two-tier management assistance program 
\\ollid screen businesses; move them up to the second tier, as dictated 
h\ an assessment of their potential for growth; and, once in the second 
ti~r. direct them to the innovation center for assessment. The innovation 
lenter should be publicized within Nebraska so that budding entre 
preneurs know where to obtain help, 
The two tiered management assistance system, combined with the 
Innovation center, could provide a coordinated assistance program that 
\\ollid serve all of Nebraska's small businesses that seek assistance. It 
llluid also identity those firms that have significant economic develop-
ment potential and provide high-potential firms with specialized 
management and scientific assistance designed to release them from 
their constraints. 
Build a Long-range Technology Base 
\clost areas of the United States have drawn their economic develop-
ment from a few related industries. In the late nineteenth century, New 
England grew through the development and expansion of textile and 
,hoe industries. In the first half of this century, Detroit, Pittsburgh, and 
Cleveland grew with the steel and automobile industries. After World 
\\a[ II, Houston grew with oil and natural gas. Even Nebraska grew, 
,lowly but steadily, throughout the post-World War II period with 
JgricuJture and food products. Now, like Detroit, Cleveland, and 
Houston, Nebraska is looking for a new economic base. 
It is difficult to have the technological foreSight to identity the growth 
:echnology of the 1990s. Such foresight is the focus of thousands of 
:inancial analysts who study industry after industry and product after 
~[()duct trying to identity the best investment opportunities. Among the 
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three economic success stories described earlier, only one resulted fr 
an overt decision by a public official to choose a specific technology. ~~ 
President of the University of Utah chose biotechnology. How~ e 
assuming that Nebraska's government can somehow match the valu;er, 
this guess is foolhardy. of 
A scatter-gun approach to research and develoment may yield SOIne 
results, but Nebraska does not have enough resources to shoot at th 
problem. The $2 million authorized by the last legislature for the 
Research and Development Authority is miniscule compared Wi~ 
spending by major corporations to find new industries and products. 
For Nebraska, the proper polk)' is to ask the university to pick a few 
scientifically talented individuals who possess the characteristics of 
entrepreneurship. The legislature should provide special appropriations 
to the university to fund research professorships for scientists who have 
the ability to create innovations and the potential to commercialize their 
innovations. These people should be supported for at least 10 years 
before any core of new firms can be expected in Nebraska's high-
technology center, Cornhusker Plain. 
After 10 years, another long-term investment in the future must be 
made; several more people with various technological specialties 
should be brought into the university so that when the new technology 
of Cornhusker Plain runs its course and begins to fade another core of 
technology will emerge to vital ize the state. The Boston experience of3O 
to 50 years of decline prior to renewed economic growth need not be 
repeated in Nebraska. 
Recommendations on the Research and Development Authority 
The 89th Legislature gave Nebraska the ubiquitous Nebraska Research 
and Development Authority (NRDA). NRDA has been assigned the 
responsibility of resolving the legislature'S indecision about what is best 
for Nebraska's economic development. The legislature assigned all 
activities to NRDA: for example, identifY technological problems, 
proVide financial investment, advise universities, recommend legisla-
tion, coordinate efforts to attract new technology businesses, establish 
research and development centers, establish incubator facilities, 
coordinate information development, and distribute and develop a 
communications network. 
'neSS 'mel Economic Development 
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I 'Clntages oJ NRDA The advantages ofNRDA are many. First, it places 
A( I , in the hands of an appointed group of professionals who are ll)ne~ .. 11,llv shielded from the day~to~day pressures of polItICS, Second, 
,Ylrt lJ , 1 I . h' 11 . 
! .'fl,DA has few ega constramts on ow It can a ocate Its resources. 
\ '.d NRDA has no tradition, no established pattern of procedures and 
1.~~el~ditureS which it must defend as it tries to ~evelop a n~w app.roach 
l! 'onomic development. Fourth, and most Important, It proVIdes a 
tl) el C f . . 
ram that could take the lorm 0 the mnovatlon center recom~ 
prog h . . b' d . . 
: 'Illied above, t at IS, a program to revIew usmess an mnovatlve 
.1;~JS of entrepreneurs, to provide definitions of the kind of assistance 
\ uired, and to direct the entrepreneurs to the assistance, In this way, ~~A could Significantly improve the chances for an early flowering of 
"t1trepreneurship in Nebraska. 
There does not seem to be any reason why the NRDA could not 
,upport the second tier of management assistance programs recom~ 
mended above. So, perhaps with an administrative decision, the NRDA 
could resolve the current weaknesses of management and scientific 
.lssistance 'vvithin the state. Given the impending decline in federal 
funding, NRDA should act quickly to replenish the supply of funds 
needed to maintain the current management assistance programs. 
iFeakJw\ses oj NRDA NRDA has several Significant weaknesses. First, 
.IIlO foremost, the legislation does not target formation and growth of 
,mall businesses, Thus, NRDA's resources can be sought actively by large 
husinesses, And, large businesses will be more effective in acquiring 
,uch resources, 
Experience with federal agencies shows that there is a big business 
hias in federal procurement of research and development, although 
procurement policies are supposed to treat all suppliers equally. 
Congress specifically identified and countered this bias in 1982 by 
PJssingl11e Small Business Innovation Development Act (SBIDA), This 
Jet requires most federal agencies to spend a prescribed percentage of 
their extramural research and development funds with small busi 
nesses,lS 
Unless the 01ebraska Legislature amends Bill 850 (the NRDA autho~ 
riling legislation) large businesses will exert their economic influence 
il) usurp the resources that should be dedicated for small businesses, 
The 90th Legislature should make it a priority to amend Legislative Bill 
~)O to specify that NRDA's purpose is to assist small businesses primarily. 
\\ithout this change, even the managerial and scientific assistance that is 
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possible through NRDA's funding activities may be misdirected to I 
businesses. If this happens, Nebraska's entrepreneurial develop~e 
will be delayed and perhaps seriously threatened. ent 
Second, NRDA's investment and lending role draws on pUblic funds 
and is, therefore, legitimately subject to public scrutiny. Such publ' 
scrutiny assures that NRDA's expectations for risk and timeliness ~~ 
return will be similar to those of a bank, not an informal venture investo 
But, informal investment funds and patient investment funds are ~ 
Nebraska's constrained growth businesses need most. 
NRDA will behave conservatively for simple reasons. NRDA Will 
realize that it cannot justify (to the taxpayers) investment decisions 
which provide patient money to risky, innovative small bUSinesses. If 
such businesses fail to repay or delay repayment for long periods of 
time, criticism by taxpayers will be vigorous. Informal investment 
cannot be made with public funds. The directors will risk the existence 
of the NRDA if they make the kind of patient equity investments that 
Nebraska's small business communities need. Other states have estab-
lished publicly funded venture capital organizations, but no state has 
successfully installed a publicly funded patient investment organization. 
The 90th Legislature should amend the NRDA Act to exclude equity 
financing from NRDA's charter. The resources will be used more 
effectively if, instead, NRDA encourages the formation of venture capital 
clubs and pushes for the legalization of their activities. Furthermore, 
NRDA can encourage the formation of private venture capital firms. This 
effort could be part of the innovation center or the second-tier 
management assistance program recommended earlier. 
NRDA's mandate is sufficiently broad to provide opportunities for 
developing technical assistance for the long-term technology base 
recommended. However, it will be better if the legislature deals directly 
with the University of Nebraska in establishing funding for research 
professorships to develop a core of science and technology. 
On balance, NRDA can be a Significant factor in establishing an 
environment for the promotion of small businesses in Nebraska. But, the 
legislature must amend its authorization to focus its activities on small 
businesses. 
Business Recruitment Versus Business Development 
Throughout this chapter I have argued that Nebraska should invest in 
developing businesses and encourage formation and growth of small 
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, sses, The argument has been advanced that recruiting branch 
j)Uslne(;f big businesses is not cost effective in establishing economic 
1)I~llltls pl11ent. Both the theory of Schumpeter and the economic I ,\'e 0 
L t , rch findings of the last 10 years support this view. 
re):Jt the question arises persistently whether the state should divide its 11~~ between recruiting big businesses and developing small busi-
d ()e's The question arises because it is difficult to break with tradition, 
l:es~1~~l110re, although big business plant expansions are insignificant 
!'urt . I h h 'b' . f' I I I trl'butors to natlona growt ,t ey can contf! ute slgm lcant y to oca (lIn 
regional growth. 
llr The reality remains, however, that Nebraska is one of 50 states that 
d\'ertise, promote, and beg for plants from large firms. Nebraska has a 
;~i 'h taX rate and no outstanding physical or population characteristics. h~ry advantage that Nebraska cites in its advertising and promotional 
literature is claimed by at least ten other states. 
But. Nebraska cannot turn its back on firms that are locating new 
plants or offices, Instead, it must provide information that will allow 
them to assess Nebraska along with their other alternatives. It probably 
~dso needs to continue offering tax incentives, such as reduced property 
t;LXes, to meet the competitive pressures of other states. 
The governor should direct the Department of Economic Develop-
ment to maintain an information center that will promote the virtues of 
IJrious communities throughout the state to large corporations that are 
considering new plant locations in Nebraska. This information should 
he supplied to every business that requests it. However, the aggressive 
activities of recruitment, such as advertiSing, promotional visits to large 
businesses, and gubernatorial visits to corporate executive suites, 
~hould be discontinued, Such activities are very expensive and the 
money can be better invested in Nebraska's small businesses. A passive 
program of responding to firms' requests for information about 
\ebraska is recommended, Substantial money can be saved bya<;suming 
a cooperative but passive approach to business recruitment. 
Conclusions 
:.lebraska should recognize that Schumpeter described the future as 
an entrepreneurial economy. Given this model, I recommend a grass 
roots effort to coax Nebraska's current entrepreneurial potential into 
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flowering to produce new firms and new jobs in the next 10 years.1h 
core of this grass roots effort is creating an economic environment that.e 
conducive to providing assistance to help new businesses overcol1llS 
their constraints so that they can grow and prosper. Their Successes \\Iil~ 
in turn, create more new firms from spin-offs. I 
Pooling the state's resources to provide management assistance to 
each economic core and constrained growth business will stimulate 
economic activity. Facilitating capital acquisition through venture capital 
clubs in all major cities will assure patient capital for the stimulated 
entrepreneurial activity. Establishing a small business innovation center 
through NRDA will help entrepreneurs define their opportunities and 
needs. And, developing several core technologies through selected 
university professorships will assure a revitalization of economic growth 
in future generations. 
Although all of these actions seem expensive in a state with severely 
limited resources, some of the costs have already been allocated to 
economic development through the NRDA. And, some costs can be paid 
by transferring funds from business recruitment activities. 
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